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Structural changes in the European natural gas market such as liberalization, increasing demand, and 
growing import dependency have triggered new attempts to model this market accurately. This paper 
presents a model of the European natural gas supply, GASMOD, which is structured as a two-stage-
game of successive natural gas exports to Europe (upstream market) and wholesale trade within 
Europe (downstream market), and which explicitly includes infrastructure capacities. We compare 
three possible market scenarios: Cournot competition on both markets, perfect competition on both 
markets, and perfect competition on the downstream with Cournot competition on the upstream 
market. We find that Cournot competition on both markets is the most realistic representation of 
today’s European natural gas market, where suppliers at both stages generate a mark-up at the expense 
of the final customer (double marginalization). Our results yield a diversified supply portfolio with 
newly emerging (LNG) exporters gaining market shares. Enforcing perfect competition on the 
European downstream market would in positive welfare effects. The limited infrastructure strongly 
influences the results, and we identify bottlenecks mainly for intra-European trade relations whereas 
transport capacity on the upstream market is sufficient (with the exception of Norwegian exports) in 
the Cournot scenario. 
Zusammenfassung: 
Der europäische Erdgasmarkt erfährt derzeit tiefgreifende Veränderungen wie Liberalisierung, 
steigende Nachfrage und steigende Importabhängigkeit. Dies hat zu verstärkten Bemühungen geführt, 
den europäischen Erdgasmarkt korrekt abzubilden. Das hier vorgestellte Modell GASMOD stellt den 
europäischen Erdgasmarkt als ein zweistufiges Spiel dar. Auf der ersten Stufe erfolgen Exporten nach 
Europa, auf der zweiten Stufe wird Großhandel innerhalb Europas betrieben; Infrastrukturkapazitäten 
werden auf beiden Stufen explizit einbezogen. Wir vergleichen drei Szenarien: Cournot-Wettbewerb 
auf beiden Marktstufen, vollständiger Wettbewerb auf beiden Stufen, sowie Cournot-Wettbewerb auf 
der Export- und vollständigen Wettbewerb auf der Großhandelsstufe. Wir zeigen, dass zweistufiger 
Cournot-Wettbewerb (doppelte Marginalisierung) den heutigen europäischen Erdgasmarkt am besten 
abbildet. In unseren Ergebnissen erhalten wir ein diversifiziertes Importportfolio für Europa. Neu auf 
den Markt kommende Flüssiggas (LNG-) Exporteure gewinnen Marktanteile. Vollständiger 
Wettbewerb auf dem europäischen Großhandelsmarkt würde positive Wohlfahrtseffekte bringen. Die 
beschränkten Infrastrukturkapazitäten beeinflussen die Ergebnisse maßgeblich. Engpässe treten 
hauptsächlich im inner-europäischen Handel auf, allerdings nicht auf der Exportstufe; die einzige 
Ausnahme sind die norwegischen Exportkapazitäten. 
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The natural gas market in the European Union is undergoing considerable change. Three main 
challenges for the next decades can be identified: the liberalization of the industry initiated by the 
European Commission, an increasing demand for natural gas and, simultaneously, an increasing 
import dependency on gas supplied from outside the European Union. These changes and the high 
political stakes motivate a closer look at the gas sector. The market structure within the European 
Union as well as the import relations to gas producing countries are issues that need further research. 
The numerical simulation model developed in this paper, called “GASMOD”, is a contribution to this 
research, taking a close look at demand and supply structures, and in particular at the infrastructure 
component. The static version of GASMOD presented in this paper aims at combining a realistic 
representation of the market structure with an analysis of required infrastructure. The remainder of the 
paper is structured as follows: after a survey of the literature, we outline the current state of the 
literature and the structure of the European gas market, with an emphasis on natural gas trade. We then 
explain the model and the data used. The subsequent  simulation results are carried out in order to 
determine the “benchmark” model specification for the reference year. They will be followed by the 
conclusions. 
2  State of the literature 
The GASMOD model follows a number of other modeling attempts of the European gas sector. The 
apparent structure of the sector suggests modeling the market with oligopolistic competition in a game 
theoretic framework. Mathiesen et al. (1987) are the first in the recent literature to study market power 
in the European natural gas market. They are followed by Golombek et al. (1995) and Golombek et al. 
(1998) who analyze the effects of liberalizing the natural gas market in Western Europe, distinguishing 
between upstream (producers) and downstream (traders) agents on the gas market. Here, liberalization 
of the European gas market is defined as the situation where downstream traders can exploit arbitrage 
possibilities between countries as well as between market segments (industry, and local distribution 
companies for households). The numerical simulation of their model indicates that liberalization 
increases upstream competition and thus welfare. Golombek et al. (1995) have had a lasting influence 
on the further research in the field because they suggested marginal cost curves for several natural gas 
producers (Algeria, Russia/CIS, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom) which have been 
widely used since. 
However, analyzing energy markets with large-scale simulation models, in terms of data input, 
regional dis-aggregation, etc, quickly reaches computational limits. For this reason there exist a 
number of linear programming models of the European, the North American or the global natural gas 
market. The main drawback to this type of model is the underlying assumption of perfect competition 
which is not satisfying at least for the European market. Generally, these models optimize social Discussion Papers   551 
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welfare which seems to be an unrealistic abstraction of a market where oligopolistic firms determine 
supply and prices. Within the group of linear models and specifically for the European market, the 
EUGAS model (Perner (2002), Perner and Seeliger (2004)) is a dynamic model of long-term 
optimization of European gas supply, taking into account production and transport capacities, but 
treating gas demand exogenously. With its rich data base and its dynamic investment modeling, the 
EUGAS model has been the basis for several extensions, as  e.g. the combination with electricity 
market models (Perner (2002), Bartels and Seeliger (2005)), the introduction of global gas reserves 
(Düweke and Hamacher (2005)), and the extension to a global model currently under way. 
Besides models of partial equilibrium, there also exist general equilibrium models with a high 
disaggregation for the gas sector. One example is the World Gas Trade Model (Hartley and Medlock 
(2004)). However, these models work with the underlying assumption of perfect competition as well, 
which makes them less appropriate for the studying the European market. 
As highlighted by the first modeling attempts of the 1990s, the European natural gas market is 
characterized by an oligopolistic market structure with a small number of producers with access to 
Europe, as well as a small number of wholesale traders on the European market. The NATGAS model 
(Mulder and Zwart (2005)) therefore chooses the representation of an oligopolistic producer market 
where a small number of strategic natural gas producers are facing price-taking arbitragers (traders) on 
the downstream market. A similar market setting is applied in Egging and Gabriel (forthcoming) 
where the strategic producers bid with conjectured supply functions, as in several electricity market 
models. 
provide an extensive survey of strategic models for restructured natural gas markets, insisting on the 
fact that single stage models are generally easy to formulate, but that two stage models are more 
appropriate to capture the intricate reality of (European and other) natural gas markets; however, they 
are also more complex leading to possible avenues for future mathematical programming research. 
The GASTALE model (Boots et al. (2004)) is the first attempt to apply the structure of successive 
oligopoly in gas production and trading in a large-scale simulation model. This model is similar to 
ours in that its underlying structure is a two-stage game. However, a number of simplifying 
assumptions, such as symmetry of traders, diminish the generality of this approach of double 
marginalization. Moreover, Boots et al. (2004)assume the domestic production to be an exogenous 
value instead of including it in the optimization. Another difference with GASMOD (see details in 
section 3) is the use of cost functions and linear demand functions from Golombek et al. (1995). 
Whereas the static GASTALE model does not consider infrastructure capacity limitations, its recent 
dynamic version includes investments in scarce transport and production infrastructure (Lise et al. 
(2005)). 
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3  Structure and Dynamics of the European Natural Gas Sector 
There are currently changes ongoing on the demand as well as on the supply side of the European 
natural gas sector. These changes do not only have an impact on the natural gas market within Europe 
but also on the supply relations between Europe and other gas producing countries. Hence, the gas 
sector has been identified as a strategic sector by the European Commission (European Commission 
(2001)) and by the International Energy Agency (IEA). Let us briefly examine the three main 
challenges for the sector:  
•  First, the European Commission has pushed for a progressive liberalization of the European 
natural gas sector, a process that is still ongoing.
1 Ownership unbundling, third party access to 
gas transport infrastructure, end of the destination clause are some of the keywords in this 
process. Liberalization of the downstream wholesale market and of gas distribution has led to a 
reduction of the part of long-term contracts in the supply relationships. Previous liberalization 
experiences in the US and the UK have shown that the share of long-term contracts diminishes, 
although it always remains (well) above 50% (IEA (2004c)).
2 However, the natural gas sector in 
many European countries still is characterized by de facto national monopolies of wholesale 
trading (e.g. Gaz de France in France, ENI in Italy, ENAGAS in Spain), or by a very limited 
number of active companies (e.g. E.ON-Ruhrgas, RWE and Wintershall in Germany) which 
leaves considerable space for strategic behavior to these companies. 
•  Second, European demand of natural gas is likely to rise further over the next decades. Natural 
gas is expected to play an increasing role in the energy mix, mainly because of its relatively low 
carbon dioxide emissions within the context of growing climate concerns and political climate 
measures. Thus, the share of natural gas in the total primary energy demand in the European 
Union (EU-25) is expected to increase from 23% at present to a projected 32% in 2020. This 
goes hand in hand with an increase of the absolute level of gas consumption from approximately 
430 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year today to a projected 790 bcm per year in 2020 (IEA 
(2004d)). The rise in demand will mainly be driven by an increasing utilization for power 
generation; the share of natural gas in power generation is expected to rise from 15% in 2002 to 
over 35% in 2030 (IEA (2004d), p. 154). 
•  Third, since Europe can only partly satisfy its gas demand with indigenous production, rising 
demand also implies increasing import dependency. Indigenous production in the European 
Union is concentrated in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands which account for three 
quarters of the European production.
3 However, production in these countries will at best remain 
at the current level but will probably decrease because the fields in the North Sea are running 
                                                 
1 Cf. “Acceleration Directive” 2003/55/EC, which followed Directive 98/30/EC. Also see the Benchmarking Reports 
annually issued by the European Commission (e.g. European Communities (2005)). 
2 Also see Neumann and Hirschhausen (2004) for a study of the evolution of long-term contracts in continental Europe. 
3 In our model, we do not consider Norway as a part of Europe since it is one of the big producers from outside the European 
Union. However we do not define Europe exclusively as the European Union since we have included a number of non-EU 




4 Especially the UK is becoming a net importer of natural gas soon; most analysts 
expect the turning point to be reached within the next decade (e.g. IEA (2004d)). So, in different 
scenarios, the gas import dependency of the EU-25 is estimated by the International Energy 
Agency to increase from the current 49% (233 bcm in 2002) to over 80% (639 bcm) in 2020.  
A crucial question is where the future gas supplies will come from. Russia, the country with the 
largest gas reserves in the world
5, currently is the most important gas supplying country to the 
European Union (see Table 1) and is expected to expand this role. Its market share is projected 
to increase from the current 40% of EU imports to around two-thirds (European Commission 
(2001)). However, this forecast ignores the high investment costs that are needed to bring gas 
from new fields on stream, the large investments required to modernize and expand the transport 
infrastructure, and a certain political cautiousness in the EU not to rely to heavily on gas imports 
from Russia. North Africa, and especially Algeria, Egypt and Libya, have made significant 
efforts to improve their status as reliable, large-scale suppliers to Europe. However, the region 
has yet to conquer a market share in European supply that corresponds to its low-cost reserves, 
be it via pipeline or as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Additional gas supplies will also come 
from new areas such as the Middle East, where 40% of the proven global gas reserves are 
located and where LNG export terminals have been constructed for about a decade now.  
Table 1: Natural gas supplies to Europe from major exporters in bcm per year (2004) 
Norway Netherlands Russia  Algeria Middle  East Nigeria 
 
bcm % bcm % bcm % bcm % bcm % bcm % 
Total 
imports 
Belgium /Luxemburg  7  35%  8  37%  0  1%  3     –     –     21 
Germany  26  29%  22  24%  38  41%  –    –    –     92 
Finland / Sweden  –     –     5  81%  –     –     –     6 
France  15 33%  –      12 26%  7  15% 0,1  0,2% 1  2%  45 
Greece  –    –    2  80%  1  20%  –    –     3 
UK  9  80%  1  4%  –     –     –     –     11 
Italy  7  10% 10 14% 21 30% 26 37%  –      4  5%  70 
Netherlands  4  32%        3  20%  –     –     –     14 
Austria  1  10%  –    6  77%  –    –    –     8 
Spain / Portugal  2  7%  –     –     16  53%  5  17%  6  20%  31 
Baltic*  –    –    5  100% –    –    –     5 
Poland  1  5%  –    8  87%  –    –    –     9 
Czech / Slovak Rep.  / 
Hungary  3  9%  –   24  85%  –  –  –   28 
Slovenia/Croatia  (FY)  –    –    2  73%  0  20%  –    –     2 
Bulgaria / Romania  –     –     8  85%  –     –     –     9 
Turkey  –    –     14  65%  3  15%  –    1  5% 22 
Total Exports to 
Europe  75  40   146   56   5   12   374 
Source: BP (2005), 
* Estonia from IEA (2004b) for 2003 
                                                 
4 This is reflected by the reserves-production ratio, which was equal to 6.1 and 21.7 at end 2004 for the UK and the 
Netherlands, respectively (BP (2005)). 




LNG is a form of supply with a growing importance for Europe. European LNG imports are 
currently bound by regasification capacity. More and more regasification terminals are built in 
Europe. LNG shipments mainly come from North Africa, Nigeria and the Middle East. Contrary 
to pipeline trade, there is an element of competition on the LNG market, because Europe is in 
direct price competition with the North American market, and prospectively with the Asian 
market as well. The higher flexibility is one of the main differences of LNG with pipeline 
supply which is bound by asset-specific infrastructure availability. 
4  Data and Model Description 
4.1 Data 
We aim at an exhaustive representation of all relevant players on the European natural gas market. 
Table 2 summarizes the exporting and importing regions included in the model. We include Iraq and 
Venezuela although they have no gas export capacity yet because we want to be able to compute 
forecasts of their exports in other versions of the model. We assume here that there is one gas 
company per country or region, which is justified by still existing gas companies in several countries 
such as GdF in France, Gazprom in Russia etc.
6 
Table 2: Regions in the GASMOD model 
Exporting Regions  Importing Regions 
Algeria United  Kingdom 
Libya Netherlands 
Egypt  Spain / Portugal 
Iraq France 
Iran  Italy / Switzerland 
Middle East (Qatar, UAE, Oman, Yemen) Belgium / Luxemburg 
Russia Germany 
Norway Denmark 
Netherlands  Sweden / Finland 
United Kingdom  Austria 
Nigeria Poland 
Trinidad  Czech Rep. / Slovak Rep. / Hungary 
Venezuela  Former Yugoslavia / Albania 
  Romania / Bulgaria 




We use data for the base year 2003. We focus on the trade relations so we do not distinguish intra-year 
seasons. Data on reference trade flows, consumption and prices for the base year come from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA (2004a), IEA (2004b)) and from BP (2004). Data on production 
                                                 
6 This assumption is not uncommon in the literature, see for instance Egging and Gabriel (forthcoming). However, the model 
formulation allows to include more than one player per country which would be more realistic when modeling the future 
European natural gas market. Discussion Papers   551 
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capacity in the European regions is based on IEA (2004b) and own estimations. Transport capacity 
data comes from GTE
7, the European organization of the national TSOs (transmission system 
operators) for intra-European capacities, and from OME (2001) for exporter capacities. 
Production and transport cost data (“border prices”) are taken from OME (2001). This is long-run 
marginal cost data, including likely investments on existing infrastructure. We add transport costs 
within Europe as unit costs per unit of gas and km of average distance between countries as assumed 
by Oostvoorn (2003); they include transport costs (e.g. gas used for compression), losses and possible 
transit fees. The cost data is a crucial input to the model with an important influence on the results. 
Given the long distance to the market, Russian gas is among the expensive suppliers in Europe. In the 
OME (2001) data, LNG is still a high-cost supplier with costs of around 3 US-$ per Mbtu (million 
British Thermal unit) to the EU border for typical LNG exporters as Nigeria, Venezuela and the 
Middle East (Table 3). Norway is a producer at fairly high costs, whereas Algeria and the European 
producers (United Kingdom and the Netherlands) can export at relatively low costs to Europe. 
Political and other “soft” considerations (e.g. the reliability of an exporter) do not enter the cost data 
and are not taken into account in this model.. The same is true for reserves which do not enter in the 
calculation of the production capacity of the producers. 
Table 3: Cost data (border prices) of selected producer countries 
Producer country Border  price in US-$ per Mbtu Border price in US-$ per tcm
Netherlands 1.65 52.15 
Norway (to Germany) 2.10 82.06 
Russia via Ukraine*  2.55 79.92 
Algeria to Italy**/ Spain**  2.07 / 2.15 84.41 / 85.63 
Middle East (LNG)** 2.91 104.75 
Source: OME (2001), and own calculations 
* unweighted average border price at the Slovak border 
** average border price weighted by export capacity 
4.2 Model 
We structure the European natural gas market as a two-stage-game of successive imports to Europe 
(first stage, upstream) and trade within Europe (second stage, downstream). First, gas producing 
companies decide on their exports, mostly from countries outside Europe, to European countries. 
Simultaneously, indigenous producers in Europe, for instance in Germany, Italy, Austria, etc. decide 
about their production quantities. Thus, indigenous producers and exporters are directly competing 
with each other. Note that the endogenous determination of indigenous production quantities is a 
novelty compared to other gas market models where indigenous production usually is entered as an 
exogenous, pre-determined value.  
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On the second stage, gas trading companies in Europe which have imported gas and which have 
bought indigenously produced gas sell this gas in the European countries, including their own country.  
We implicitly assume a liberalized, but oligopolistic market in Europe: TPA (Third Party Access) to 
the gas network is ensured for each exporter and each European trading company. There is no 
destination clause which means that consumers are free to choose their supplier which may well come 
from abroad (e.g. French consumers can purchase from the German trader). Since the focus of our 
model is on the strategic relations between the producers on the first stage, and between the traders on 
the second stage, we do not distinguish several market segments (such as industry, power generation, 
residential sector). Furthermore, we implicitly assume that there is no vertical integration between the 
two stages; this assumption goes hand in hand with the aggregation of one player per country that we 
use. Although some players along the LNG chain and to a lesser extent the pipeline gas chain have 
started to integrate vertically from the producer to the downstream trader, we believe that overall this 
aggregation reflects the trade relations in the natural gas market reasonably well.  
GASMOD can be characterized as a game theoretic model assuming perfect information. The 
producers on the first stage have perfect information about the demand situation on the second stage 
and decide on their production quantities by taking into account the downstream market situation. 
According to standard game theory the appropriate method of determining equilibrium prices and 
quantities is backwards induction. We assume the exporters to be Stackelberg leaders over the traders, 
that is the traders on the second stage are price-takers of the equilibrium prices determined on the first 
stage.  
On each stage, the players play a non-cooperative game and maximize their individual payoffs. 
Following the literature of energy market modeling, we model the oligopolistic markets on both stages 
with Cournot (quantity) competition instead of Bertrand (price) competition.
8 By assuming an 
oligopolistic market structure on both stages the problem of double marginalization is represented: 
upstream and downstream markets are imperfectly competitive and suppliers on both markets exert 
market power, i.e. their price includes a margin. The downstream oligopoly leads to an additional 
price distortion and hence to an even less efficient allocation compared to the situation of a single 
oligopoly (cf. Spengler (1950)). 
The equilibrium on each stage is the solution of the non-linear profit optimization program of each 
player. On each stage, each player maximizes his profits (under certain capacity constraints, see 





fr r f fr fr x Max x pe c t x Π= − −          ( 1 )  
                                                 
8 This seems to be suitable in a market where many relations are still based on long-term take-or-pay (ToP) contracts. In ToP 
contracts the quantities can be chosen in the short run given the demand and price developments; however a minimum 
quantity must always be paid to the seller. Also, Bertrand competition generally yields lower price margins and even prices  
equal to marginal cost (i.e. the perfect competition equilibrium) which would be unrealistic for a highly concentrated market 
as the natural gas market in Europe. Discussion Papers   551 
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, fr x  is the supply by exporter f to wholesale trader r ,  r pe  is the inverse demand function (see 
below),  r c  is the production cost function of producer f , and  , fr t  his transport costs for delivering to 
trader  r . In line with the literature we suppose unit production and transport costs. We neglect 
transport costs within each European country / region by setting them at a low level because we focus 
on the international trade relationship. 
Taking into account the behavioral assumptions of Cournot competition and the standard definitions of 
own-price elasticity and market share, we derive the first order condition (FOC) of the profit 
maximization program. In a pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium no player must have an incentive to 

















In the case of prefect competition, in contrast, each player is price taker of the market equilibrium 

















We use this property (the parameter α ) to define different model settings of either Cournot 
competition or perfect competition on one or both stages. 
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 is the price margin obtained by the oligopolistic supplier. In 
other words, suppliers can exert market power with respect to their competitors. The margin is equal to 
zero in the case of perfect competition. With this formulation we follow Kemfert and Tol (2000) and 
Kemfert and Kalashnikov (undated) who use a similar optimization program in a model of the German 
respectively the European electricity market. 
Each player is restricted by capacity limitations such as transport infrastructure constraints (export, 
import capacities in terms of pipelines and LNG terminals), and production capacities. On the first 
stage of exports to Europe, gas trade is restricted by the export infrastructure of each producer and the 
import capacity of each wholesale trader. In addition, the indigenous (domestic) production capacity in 
each European country is limited. On the second stage, the supply by each trader is restricted by the 
transport capacity of the pipeline grid between him and each end-user market. We introduce these 
restrictions of the exports, imports and domestic production with shadow prices (Lagrangian 
multipliers) in the respective first order conditions where the shadow price represents the valuation of 
an additional available capacity unit. Hence, the FOC (5) is completed by the shadow prices and for 
the exporter  f  this is equal to:  
,
, *1 * e x p
fr
ff r r f r
r





+= + − − 

       ( 6 )  
where  exp f λ  and  r imp λ  are the shadow prices for export capacity of the exporter  f  and the import 
capacity of importer r , respectively. 
Since we consider market relations we do not restrict bilateral trade relations to adjacent countries (as  
e.g. Egging and Gabriel (forthcoming)). An exporter can supply each European region but not more 
than can physically be transported through the natural gas grid (or via the LNG terminals) connecting 
them. This way we can represent trade flows as observed in reality where for instance the Czech 
Republic has imported 2.62 bcm of natural gas from Norway (BP (2005)).  
For the natural gas consumption on the end-market m , we assume an iso-elastic demand function of 













         ( 7 )  
m y  and  m p  are the quantities and prices,  0m d  and  0m p  are the reference demand and the reference 
price on the market m  in the base year, and  m σ  is the price elasticity of the final demand. We prefer 
an iso-elastic demand function instead of a linear demand function (as suggested by Golombek et al. 
(1995)) because this allows to have a non-negative demand for every price. We assume the demand 




9 which reflects a certain inelasticity of the natural gas demand.
10 Shifting from natural gas to 
another fuel would require changes in the technical installations, which are costly and time-
demanding. The right choice of the elasticities is crucial in a model with an iso-elastic demand 
function; we have carried out (but not reported) several sensitivity analyses which confirm the 
correctness of our choice. 
Equilibrium is reached at the intersection of demand and supply. The demand coming from the 
downstream (end consumer) market is addressed to the traders who forward it to the exporters. The 
combination of the individual Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (FOC) and the market balance gives us 
the following non-linear equilibrium model: 
FOC upstream:     
,
, *1 e x p
fr
ff r r f r
r





+= + − − 

    (6) 












    (8) 
FOC downstream:    
,














    (9) 
Market balance:     ,, rm fr r
mf
y x domprod =+ ∑∑       ( 1 0 )  
This model is programmed in the MCP (mixed complementarity problem) format in GAMS, and solve 
with  a standard algorithm for MCP, PATH.
11 
5 Simulation  Results 
The model is run for different market scenarios. We would like to assess which market scenario fits 
the current (2003) reality of the European natural gas market best. From our sector description we 
have already drawn the preliminary conclusion that the European natural gas market is an imperfect 
market, with a double marginalization structure. Therefore, in addition to the scenario of double 
marginalization, we also simulate the scenarios of perfect competition on both markets or of the 
downstream market only. Whereas the scenario of perfect competition on both market stages seems 
very unrealistic, the liberalization of the European gas sector is supposed to lead to competitive 
downstream market in the future. 
                                                 
9 We assume the price elasticity to be higher (in absolute values) by 0.05 for countries where natural gas does not have a 
large share in energy consumption, i.e. Spain/Portugal, Sweden/Finland, Poland, Balkan, and Greece. Thus we assume that 
switching to alternative fuels is easier for countries where dependency on natural gas is lower. 
10 Liu (2004)finds long-run own price elasticities for natural gas between –0.774 and 0.075 for OECD countries. Earlier 
estimations find higher elasticities (in absolute values), see e.g. Estrada and Fugleberg (1989), Al-Sahlawi (1989). Boots et 
al. (2004) use elasticities from Pindyck (1979) which are considerably higher (between 1.17 and 2.23). 
11 For more details about programmation in the MCP format see Rutherford (1995) and Ferris and Munson (2000). Discussion Papers   551 
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We recall that GASMOD in its version presented here is a quasi-static model to the extent that it only 
regards one time period. This means that we reproduce the base year 2003 and the results must be 
interpreted as market outcomes if the upstream and downstream markets corresponded perfectly to the 
characteristics of Cournot oligopoly or perfect competition. Thus from the proximity of our results to 
the original data we can derive conclusions about the actual market structure on the European natural 
gas market. In the following, we highlight the general results for the endogenous variables, thereby 
concluding about the currently prevailing market structure and effects of alternative market scenarios. 
5.1  Upstream market: Exports to Europe and Domestic Production 
5.1.1 Exports 
Table 4 reports the results for the exports on the first stage. Compared to the reference data for 2003 
(also see Section 3, Table 1), in the Cournot scenario, exports from some traditional suppliers to 
Europe (Russia, Algeria) decrease while newly emerging exporters (Middle East, Nigeria) gain market 
shares. Among the large traditional exporters only Norway, the Netherlands and UK remain at a 
significant level in this static scenario. Most strikingly, Russia loses a considerable market share in 
Europe, partly because of its relatively high production and especially transport costs due to the long 
distance to the European market. This is also due to the model formulation where large players like 
Russia have the same strategic “weight” as smaller players like Nigeria, Trinidad etc.
12 In the Cournot 
scenario, LNG exporters like the Middle East, Nigeria and Trinidad gain some market share. For LNG 
we may expect an even greater increase of exports to Europe in the future since costs of LNG 
shipments are projected to decrease further in the coming years. 
The comparison with the perfect competition scenario confirms that there is strategic withholding of 
quantities in the Cournot scenario in order to increase the price above marginal cost levels (also see 
Section 4.2.2. for the prices). In perfect competition, the greater demand because of lower prices 
allows market entry and increased market share of higher cost producers such as Russia and Egypt. 
LNG and other non-traditional exporters supply even more natural gas to Europe than in the Cournot 
scenario. The demand increase compared to the benchmark scenario is such that even higher cost 
producers are bound by their transport capacity (see Section 4.3.1). Since demand on the markets 
prefers the lowest-cost supplier, exporters first serve the markets which are the closest to them (in 
terms of combined production and transport costs); in a context of high demand this explains why the 
UK and the Netherlands do not export but supply only local traders in the perfect competition 
scenario.  
 
                                                 
12 Considering firms instead of countries, including multinational firms which are typical for the global natural gas market, 
would most likely resolve this uncertainty in the results. Discussion Papers   551 
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Table 4: Export quantities and market share (as percentage of total exports to Europe)
13  
Cournot Competition  Perfect Competition  EU liberalization 



















Algeria  14,7  4,4%  66,0  14,6%  66,0  11,9%  57,77  17,6% 
Libya  4,8  1,4%  14,5  3,2%  14,5  2,6%  0,75  0,2% 
Egypt  5,0  1,5%  11,9  2,6%  11,9  2,2%   0  0,0% 
Iran  0,0  0,0%  10,0  2,2%  10,0  1,8%  3,52  1,1% 
Middle East  13,3  4,0%  26,6  5,9%  26,6  4,8%  2,43  0,7% 
Russia  58,8  17,7%  196,0  43,3%  134,4  24,3%  131,77  40,1% 
Norway  86,0  25,8%  86,0  19,0%  86,0  15,6%  68,37  20,8% 
Netherlands**  66,6  20,0%  0,0  0,0%  80,4  14,6%  42,17  12,8% 
UK**  59,4  17,8%  0,0  0,0%  81,5  14,7%  11,5  3,5% 
Nigeria  12,6  3,8%  22,7  5,0%  22,7  4,1%  10,37  3,2% 
Trinidad  12,0  3,6%  18,7  4,1%  18,7  3,4%   0  0,0% 
Total  333,1  100,0%  452,4**  100,0%  552,6**  100,0%  328,65  100,0% 
* Source: BP (2004). 
** Excluding own domestic consumption in UK and the Netherlands. If domestic consumption is included, total 
“exports” are higher in the Perfect Competition than in the Competition “ scenario as intuition suggests. 
 
Finally, we see that a perfectly competitive downstream market (scenario “EU liberalization”) would 
considerably change the outcome. Higher demand on the downstream market because of lower 
(competitive) prices triggers considerably higher exports. This contradicts the widespread thesis that 
an oligopolistic downstream market is the best response to an oligopolistic upstream market. Perfect 
competition on the downstream market with a given Cournot market on the export side also leads to  
more diversification of supplies. 
5.1.2 Domestic  Production 
Table 6 reports the quantities and market shares of domestic production. We recall that domestic 
production is endogenously determined by the profit maximizing behavior of the producers. We 
observe that the higher demand due to lower prices in perfect competition and EU liberalization leads  
to domestic production as part of the natural gas supplies in more countries than in the Cournot 
competition scenario. This completes the picture of a more diversified supply that we also derive for 
exports under the perfect competition assumption. In both scenarios with perfect competition, 
domestic production is generally higher than observed in the reference data. Often domestic 
production serves the demand when trade capacities to a country are congested (see 4.3). This is 
especially true in the perfect competition scenarios where higher quantities would have been traded if 
physically possible and where the share of domestic production in the supply is high in many 
countries. 
                                                 
13 The Netherlands and UK are considered as exporters and as importers. In this table we have removed the exports to the 
traders in the Netherlands and UK. However these quantities are available for re-export (including domestic consumption) on 
the 2
nd stage. Discussion Papers   551 
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Table 5: Domestic production quantities and market shares of the domestic producers on the 
upstream market 






Part of the 





Part of the 





Part of the 




2003 in bcm 
(IEA (2004b))
UK* 27,4  35,9%  120,0  100,0%  38,5  42,2%  108,4* 
Netherlands* 23,4  42,1%  90,0  80,7%  9,6  32,9%  73,1* 
Spain/Port.        0,3  0,7%  0,3  0,7%  0,2 
France       1,9  3,2%  1,9  2,9%  1,6 
Italy/Switz.        16,3  19,4%  16,3  13,4%  13,6 
Belgium/Lux.                    0 
Germany        13,2  21,5%  26,7  21,1%  22,2 
Denmark 1,0  44,7%  8,5  100,0%  9,6  86,4%  8,0 
Swed./Fin.                    0  
Austria                   2,1 
Poland 6,0  27,8%  6,8  38,3%  6,8  32,7%  5,6 
CSH 3,9  14,7%  3,9  3,5%  3,9  15,3%  3,3 
Balkan       4,1  100,0%  4,1  28,9%  3,4 
Rom./Bulg.        17,5  49,8%  17,5  69,3%  14,6 
Baltic                     0 
Greece             0,03  0,9%  0,03 
Turkey                   0,6 
* Here we report exports from the UK or the Netherlands to the trader in the same country. 
5.2  Downstream market: Intra-European Wholesale Market 
5.2.1 Intra-European  Trade 
Although we separate them in the presentation of results, the first and second stage are solved 
simultaneously. Thus the model is complex and the results on the second stage inherently depend on 
the first stage and vice versa. Although the results of the first stage for the Cournot scenario may be 
somewhat surprising, the results of the second stage, and especially the final consumption, indicate a 
proximity to the real world situation. Indeed, as is shown in Table 7 we generally obtain results for this 
case that are close to actual final consumption in 2003. Clearly, this gives an indication to consider the 
Cournot case as the most realistic representation of the today’s European natural gas market. The 
consumption figures in the perfect competition and the EU liberalization scenario generally are much 
higher than real world data. The notable exception of the UK can be explained by the observed 
competitive market structure in this country in contrast to the rest of Europe. 
Looking at particular regions, some interesting features can be discovered (Appendix, Table 9). For 
instance, direct exports to Germany (1
st stage trade) only come from Northern Europe, especially 
Norway. This result is confirmed by several sensitivity analyses. However, Germany is still 
consuming Russian gas, as in reality, but which is indirectly supplied via Eastern European (Czech 
and Polish) and Austrian traders. Reciprocally, Russia is not directly exporting to Western Europe, but Discussion Papers   551 
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mainly to Eastern Europe. This is due to the production and transport cost structure. Hence, the results 
in GASMOD are more cost-driven than trade relations are in today’s reality where they are often the 
consequence of geo-political considerations and the existence of destination clauses. However, the 
results of our model point to an increased diversity of supply which is also a political objective in 
Europe. 
Table 6: Final consumption of natural gas in bcm per year 
Markets  Cournot Competition Perfect Competition  EU liberalization  Consumption 
2003 
UK 49,5  113,3  95,9  95,4 
Netherlands  38,9 69,6 56,9 40,3 
Spain/Portugal  27,5 39,8 39,4 26,6 
France  50,7 60,2 63,3 43,3 
Italy/Switzerland 96,0  115,9 121,1  73,6 
Belgium/Luxembourg  16,1 21,3 21,4 16,0 
Germany  100,7 147,4 138,3  85,5 
Denmark 0  6,2  5,7  5,4 
Sweden/Finland  2,0 6,3 2,2 5,3 
Austria  11,9 15,5 14,6  9,4 
Poland  12,6 17,6 16,2 11,2 
Czech/Slovak/Hungary  26,3 41,8 36,4 28,8 
Balkan  9,7 10,0  10,5 7,7 
Bulgaria/Romania  13,3 29,2 28,9 20,9 
Baltic 0  3,3  5,7  5,0 
Greece  2,3 3,7 3,6 2,3 
Turkey 0  33,6  33,1  20,9 
TOTAL  457,6 734,7 693,4 497,6 
5.2.2 Prices 
Figure 1 reports the prices on the upstream market and the downstream market for some selected 
countries. One clearly recognizes the effect of market power in the Cournot scenario where strategic 
withholding of production increases prices. However, prices are not only influenced by the market 
situation but also by the availability of import capacity for a market. Markets like the UK or 
Sweden/Finland for instance which benefit from the proximity to an exporter (own production or 
Russia, respectively) on the first stage cannot be supplied on the second stage due to missing 
infrastructure and therefore have to pay a high-mark-up to their local wholesale trader. This explains 
the heterogeneity of prices in the Cournot scenario. Clearly, this is a model effect which has to be 
removed for a more realistic representation of the European natural gas market, by modeling countries 
with this characteristics as competitive markets. 
Indeed, the picture is different in two aspects in the scenarios with perfect competition. Prices are 
distributed homogenously between the countries, and the prices generally are lower. For both 
scenarios, the premium added on the import price is equal to the transport costs of the marginal trader; 
very often there is only intra-country trade so that the difference between prices on the upstream and Discussion Papers   551 
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the downstream market equals the assumed intra-country transport costs (2 US-$ per tcm). Although 
exporters behave strategic in the EU liberalization scenario the prices are considerably lower than in 
the Cournot scenario and only about 20% higher than in the Perfect competition scenarios. This 
confirms the finding that enforcing competition on the European market would lead to increased 
welfare because it allows higher consumption of natural gas combined with lower prices.  
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5.3  Welfare Effects in Europe 
As suggested by economic theory we find larger quantities and lower prices in the market scenarios 
with perfect competition compared to the Cournot scenario. If this also translates in higher welfare, as 
we expect, our results have important implications for the market organization of the European natural 
gas sector, especially for the wholesale market. Indeed, the traditional argument consists in rejecting Discussion Papers   551 
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the need to reduce the market power of only one of the markets a double oligopoly because the of the 
market power effects of the other party. This argument is often brought forward by the European 
natural gas wholesale traders against regulation of their industry. 
However, our findings differ from this argument. As depicted in Figure 2, in the EU liberalization 
scenario we find a welfare close to the case of overall perfect competition. Both welfare results are 
unsurprisingly higher than in the double marginalization scenario. There are large welfare gains to 
expect from liberalizing the European wholesale market of natural gas. In contrast, the additional 
welfare gain from having a liberalized export market would be minimal (about 0.06%) compared to 
the EU liberalization scenario, thus again making a case for enforcing competition on the European 
wholesale market. 








Cournot Perfect Competition EU Liberalization
 
5.4  Infrastructure Capacity Constraints 
5.4.1 Upstream  Market 
On the upstream market, the only transport route which is congested in the Cournot scenario is the 
Norwegian access to Europe. Norway has relatively modest production costs, and it is situated closely 
to high demand in North-West Europe, so that transport costs are modest, too; thus, Norway is well 
positioned as a supplier to Europe. Our results are reflected in reality by the stable reserve situation 
and the increasing production capacity in Norway which make it an important exporter for the coming 
decades with the need to expand its export infrastructure.  
In contrast, in the perfect competition case and very similar in the EU liberalization case, there are 
many exporters which are bound by their actual export capacities (Table 9), either pipelines or LNG 
liquefaction terminals. Export capacities are taken into account as the existing export infrastructure in 
2003. It is striking that even an exporter with large export capacities as Russia reaches the bounds of 
its capacities but it gives an idea of the quantities that would be traded in a fully competitive market 
without capacity restrictions as compared to the actual natural gas market. This also clearly shows the Discussion Papers   551 
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necessity to take into account infrastructure capacities when modeling a network such as the natural 
gas market.  
Table 7: Export capacity utilization of each exporter
14 
 Exporters  Cournot competition  Perfect competition  EU liberalization 
 Algeria  22%  100%  100% 
 Libya  33%  100%  100% 
 Egypt  43%  100%  100% 
 Iran  0%  100%  100% 
 Middle East  50%  100%  100% 
 Russia  30%  100%  69% 
 Norway  100%  100%  100% 
 Netherlands  74% 0% 89% 
 UK  50% 0% 68% 
 Nigeria  55%  100%  100% 
 Trinidad  64%  100%  100% 
 
Table 8: Congested Intra-European capacity (used at 100 %) in the Cournot competition 
scenario 
From To 
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany  UK  
UK, Germany, Belgium  Netherlands* 
France  Spain / Portugal 
Balkan (via Slovenia), France  Italy / Switzerland 
Germany  Belgium / Luxemburg 
Belgium, Austria*  Germany* 
Germany Poland 
Austria  Czech / Slovak Republic / Hungary* 
Italy / Switzerland  Balkan 
Denmark**  Sweden / Finland** 
*  Note that these transport routes are also congested in the EU liberalization scenario. 
**  Only in the Perfect Competition and EU liberalization scenarios. 
5.4.2 Downstream  Market 
In Table 10 we indicate the congested transport routes within Europe. We focus on the Cournot 
scenario as we have identified this as the most realistic representation of today’s European natural gas 
market. The large number of bilateral transport routes that are listed seems surprising. But there clearly 
exist only a small number of cross-border natural gas pipelines within Europe, many of them with very 
limited capacity. Several studies have already pointed out that this is an important obstacle to a Single 
European market of natural gas (European  Communities (2005), Neumann et al. (forthcoming)). 
                                                 
14 Note that in addition to export capacity restrictions we have also introduced import capacity and bilateral trade restrictions. 
Whereas import capacity of European traders generally is not binding, bilateral trade capacity quite often is but with a 
structure similar to the exort capacity utilization. Discussion Papers   551 
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Although we find many congestions in two directions, this is not a necessary result since compressor 
capacity at a cross-border point may be such that more gas can flow in one direction than in the other. 
As discussed above, we observe in the results that missing transport capacity has a clear effect on 
prices since the local wholesale trader can benefit from a quasi-monopoly. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have presented a model of the European natural gas market. GASMOD is a static 
model which structures the natural gas market as a two-stage game of successive i) exports to Europe, 
and ii) trade within Europe. In contrast to other models in the literature we have applied a two-stage 
structure and have incorporated an endogenous determination of domestic production. Infrastructure 
capacities which are an important characteristic of a network industry and which may be binding are 
explicitly taken into account in the model. We use GASMOD for numerical simulations with reference 
data for the base year 2003. We model three different market scenarios: Cournot competition on both 
the upstream and the downstream market, perfect competition on both markets, and Cournot 
competition on the upstream market with a downstream market in perfect competition. 
We find that the scenario of Cournot competition is the most realistic representation of the European 
natural gas market with total export and consumption quantities close to the reference data. However, 
our results present a more diversified picture of supplies to Europe, with newly emerging (LNG) 
exporters gaining market shares in Europe. This indicates currently, other factors are at play 
determining the supply relations in the real world (e.g. long-term contracts, destination clauses, etc.). 
Results in the Cournot competition scenario are strongly influenced by infrastructure capacities since a 
limited access to a market reduces the number of players which can then exert more market power. 
With no surprise we find the highest prices, lowest quantities and lowest welfare in this scenario, 
thereby confirming the welfare-reducing effect of double marginalization. 
Whereas the scenario of perfect competition is only simulated to benchmark the results of the Cournot 
scenario, the scenario of perfect competition on the downstream market in the presence of an 
oligopoly on the upstream market merits  closer attention. Indeed this is a situation which could be 
enforced by the regulation authorities in Europe. We find that this case has an unambiguous welfare-
enhancing effect compared to double marginalization. This contradicts the widespread thesis that an 
oligopolistic downstream market is the best response to an oligopolistic upstream market. Our results 
also point to more diversified supplies than in the Cournot scenario, which is another objective of 
European energy policy.  
The comparison with real world data indicates that the current state of the European natural gas market 
is best represented by a scenario of Cournot competition. Deviations for some countries suggest that  
modeling their market with competitive behavior might be more appropriate, be it in a competitive 
fringe for smaller exporters or traders, or as competitive market because of limited access to the 




15 There are several improvements which should be included in 
GASMOD, notably, the infrastructure bottlenecks that we have identified should be the basis for 
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